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This article examines a new role for contract farming in developing countries in the light of the 
industrialisation of agriculture and the globalisation of world markets. A theoretical rationale for 
contracting in developing countries is developed on the basis of adopting new institutional economic 
theory for the purpose of matching governance forms to market failure problems and transaction 
characteristics. The history of contract farming is reviewed, together with the advantages and 
disadvantages to the various players, for the purpose of developing a list of key success factors, 
problems and some possible solutions.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Efforts to develop the agricultural sector in developing countries are now taking place 
against the background of major structural change in the world agricultural industry. 
In many developed countries, agricultural production is changing from an industry 
dominated by family-based, small-scale farms or firms to one of larger firms that are 
more tightly aligned across the production and distribution value chain (Boehlje, 
2000). In addition, the trend of market-oriented reforms, following multilateral trade 
liberalisation and especially structural adjustment programmes in developing 
countries, has led to the increased integration of world markets (Reardon & Barrett, 
2000). This has meant that farmers in the developing world are now, more than ever, 
linked to consumers and corporations of the rich nations. Although most of the 
changes in agricultural and food markets are taking place in developed countries, they 
have far-reaching implications for agricultural development efforts in developing 
countries.  
 
The changes in food and agricultural markets (the so-called industrialisation of 
agriculture) have influenced the need for higher levels of managed coordination. This 
has resulted in the introduction of different forms of vertical integration and alliances, 
which have become a dominant feature of agricultural supply chains. Allied to these 
changes is a worldwide increase in consumer demand for differentiated agricultural 
products that are relatively labour intensive (Rhodes, 1993; Royer, 1995; Pasour, 
1998).  
 
These consumer demands, combined with the reality that food safety issues are more 
likely to be a concern in the case of fresh food products, have led to major concerns 
for developing countries. Fresh food products, which include fresh meat, seafood, 
vegetables and fruits, account for half the value of total food and agricultural exports 
from developing countries (Unneveher, 2000). The need to control for high 
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and refrigerated transport, all of which require large capital investments and also 
investment in research, development and marketing, which small and medium-sized 
enterprises cannot easily afford.  
 
However, it is often only the well-endowed and skilled that have the ability to be part 
of these coordinated marketing chains and alliances. There is, therefore, a danger that 
the requirements, quality standards and food safety rules of the consumers and 
corporations (supermarkets) in the developed countries can act as effective barriers to 
participation in the high-value chains by small exporters and, to some extent, small 
producers. Only a small number of farmers in developing countries have the ability 
and luxury to be part of these lucrative markets and for them the reward is substantial.  
 
Recent studies of the managerial economics of industrialised agriculture have 
revealed crucial new insights into the economic rationale for higher levels of managed 
coordination as a choice of governance structure. In conjunction with this, the history 
of vertical coordination projects in developing countries has provided many lessons 
and a reference framework against which future development can be evaluated. All of 
these could pioneer a new approach to improve our understanding of problems of 
market access facing farmers in developing countries. This new approach, based on 
the new institutional economic theory, argues, amongst other things, that we now 
have economic actors engaging in transactions rather than a large number of atomistic 
firms constituting a ‘market’.  
 
There are serious concerns about the ability of small farms and also small 
agribusiness firms to survive in the medium term under these changing circumstances. 
However, there still remain opportunities for smaller firms and farms to exploit. This 
role could relate to product differentiation linked to products from region of origin, or 
organic products and other niche markets. The major route for continued survival 
would, however, be through exploiting other factors. One such factor is a reliance on 
external rather than internal economies of scale through networking or clustering and 
other forms of alliances. This could be among small firms or through establishing 
links between small firms or growers and larger enterprises that have already 
overcome the major barriers to market entry. These links are usually formalised 
through some form of contract similar to contract farming schemes implemented in 
the developing world. 
 
Contract farming has over the years been considered as one system that has 
considerable potential for providing a way to integrate small-scale farmers in 
developing countries into export and processing markets and into the modern 
economy. In Africa, contract farming is believed to help farmers by providing new 
technology, ready markets and secured inputs and prices. Further, contract farming 
offers a mechanism that ensures self-sustained development (Glover, 1987; 
Weatherspoon et al., 2001). Contract farming has also been a component of the most 
successful income-generating projects for smallholders, as well as an important earner 
of foreign exchange in developing countries. This is despite strong criticism that 
contract farming is just another form of exploitation with limited equity impact, 
increasing socio-economic differences and evidence of some unsuccessful schemes 
and problems for many outgrowers (cf. Glover, 1987). 
 In this article we argue that the changing nature of world agriculture provides a new 
set of reasons and objectives why contract farming could become an important 
institution for empowering poor small-scale farmers in developing countries, as well 
as a ‘vehicle’ for providing access to more lucrative markets. Other reasons for the 
renewed attention to contract farming are related to the many economic reforms in 
developing countries that have reduced public expenditure on credit programmes, 
staple crop price supports, input subsidies and government research and extension 
programmes (Key & Runsten, 1999). 
 
The article starts by reviewing the changing nature of agriculture and why it has 
paved the way for a ‘re-emergence’ of contract farming or contractual relations in 
developing country agriculture. In the developed countries, contracts have almost 
become a standard feature of agriculture. For a variety of reasons, as explained above, 
contract farming is now once more a feature in developing countries. The article also 
highlights the theoretical arguments for the introduction and growth of contract 
farming in developing countries since the early 1960s, and briefly summarises the 
experience with contract farming. In Section 5 we discuss the benefits and 
disadvantages for the various players of such contractual relations and, finally, the 
aspects of contractual relations that would require attention to ensure the success of 
future ventures between agribusiness (private or state sponsored) and smaller growers 
are discussed. The article ends with some conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2.  INDUSTRIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND THE NEED FOR 
MORE VERTICAL COORDINATION 
This section describes how the forces of change, i.e. globalisation, agricultural market 
reforms in developing countries plus the so-called ‘industrialisation’ of world 
agriculture, pave the way for an increased use of contract farming as one form of 
institutional organisation to bring about greater coordination in the agro-food supply 
chain. The industrialisation of agriculture in developing countries is often shaped by a 
different set of constraints and forces than those faced by the developed world, and as 
a result, one can see a diversity of institutional arrangements emerging in developing 
countries, different to those in developed countries. As a response to the 
industrialisation of agriculture, contracting arrangements are increasingly 
coordinating modern agricultural supply chains. The exact form of this governance 
structure, however, can vary widely according to situation-specific variables. 
 
Accepting the diversity in the nature of the agricultural transformation process 
between countries, the concept of agricultural industrialisation describes the 
significant structural changes in the food and fibre system. It refers to the ‘increasing 
consolidation of farms and vertical coordination (contracting and integration) among 
the stages of the food and fibre system’ (C-FARE, 1994: 1). It also implies larger-
scale production units linked to processors, distributors and retailers through formal or 
informal arrangements (Boehlje & Doering, 2000). Although the term is a 
nomenclature for a whole range of changes, two changes stand out (Drabenstott, 
1995): 
 
•  A shift from food commodities to food products 
•  A shift from spot markets to more direct market channels, such as production 
contracts 
 Boehlje (2000) argues that the most dramatic changes in agriculture are taking place 
in terms of changes in the fundamental business proposition and the ways of doing 
business: 
 
•  The development of differentiated products 
•  The implementation of biological manufacturing 
•  The formation of food supply chains 
 
The increased industrialised nature of agriculture in both developed and developing 
countries is largely the result of biological and information technologies (Schrader, 
1986), economic growth, mechanisation, the increasing scale of organisation and the 
modernisation of production, processing and distribution systems (Sofranko et al., 
2000). Drabenstott (1995: 14) argues that there are two powerful forces driving this 
process of industrialisation: a new consumer and a new producer. The new consumers 
are a highly demanding sort, while the new producers are equipped with new 
technology and management tools that enable them to engineer food from farm to 
table. Although this sounds like an ideal situation, traditional markets do not handle 
these circumstances well.  
 
The new lifestyles of consumers in the wealthy countries of the north, shifting 
demographics and a growing appreciation for the link between diet and health have 
contributed to different eating patterns and influenced the foods consumers in these 
countries buy. The concern about food safety and the recent food scares also influence 
consumer behaviour heavily. The specific needs of consumers have led to the 
splintering of the mass food market into a large number of niche markets. As a result, 
food companies have to market customised products, each aimed at a separate market 
niche (cf. Boehlje, 2000; Drabenstott, 1995; Davis & Langham, 1995). This argument 
also applies to developing countries as a result of increased urbanisation.  
 
Present-day consumers are demanding much more than choice – they also want 
quality, consistency and value. Much of agriculture therefore has to shift from a 
philosophy from ‘here’s what we produce’ to a situation where farmers take note of 
what the consumers want. New technology, which includes bio- and information 
technology, makes it possible to ensure that agricultural and food products do have 
the characteristics consumers want (Drabenstott, 1995; Boehlje, 2000).  
 
Apart from the pressures from consumers and end-use markets, other major drivers of 
and contributors to these changes in agriculture include the following:  
 
•  Increasing competition from global market participants 
•  Economies of size and scope in production and distribution 
•  Risk mitigation and management strategies of buyers and suppliers 
•  Strategic positioning and market power/control strategies of individual businesses 
 
Increased levels of processing, improved productivity, new technology and market 
forces have expanded the range of products (Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994; Royer, 
1995) and food production has become an industrialised, capital-intensive business 
that operates in a highly competitive and unpredictable global market, is relatively 
inelastic and is faced with increased supply by competing countries (Huffman & Just, 
1994; Meliczek, 2000). The result of these forces is that the industry has evolved to optimise efficiency and minimise transaction costs, and this has resulted in fewer 
larger farms, the concentration of farming, and specialisation (Schrader, 1986; Frank 
& Henderson, 1992; Rhodes, 1993; Ling & Liebrand, 1995; Pasour, 1998). 
Agriculture has therefore seen a move away from open market production and has 
become increasingly vertically coordinated with agribusiness in order to produce a 
greater range of high-quality differentiated products (Babb, 1992; Sporleder, 1992; 
Royer, 1995; Peterson & Wysocki, 1998; Pasour, 1998; Pritchett & Liu, 1998; 
Goodhue, 1999; Sofranko et al., 2000). 
 
The need for increased coordination can also be attributed to the failure of traditional 
(spot) agricultural markets to deal with this new scenario. Usually, bulk commodities 
flow through commodity markets to food processors, which in turn market 
standardised products to consumers. Consumers now demand tailored foods and to 
ensure that they get them, food companies want more specific farm products. In 
addition, food safety is also a concern, especially regarding fresh food products, thus 
bringing about increased scrutiny and regulation in developed countries. As a result, 
processors and marketers have avoided traditional spot markets and have engaged in 
more direct market channels such as market and production contracts, full ownership 
or vertical integration.  
 
Apart from the process of industrialisation, the increasing liberalisation in world 
agricultural markets, as well as the range of domestic market reforms in developing 
countries, has a non-desirable impact on small-scale producers worldwide. The 
liberalisation efforts, the harmonisation of standards and the encouragement of 
foreign direct investment might make it very difficult for small-scale producers to 
participate in new marketing opportunities presented under the reforms (Stanton, 
2000). This stems from the typical problems of limited access to capital and technical 
assistance, and competitive buyers. Domestic market reforms in developing countries 
have boosted agricultural exports in general and provided opportunities for global and 
regional companies to invest in agribusiness in these countries. The rapid increase in 
multinational firms in the agri-food sectors has also led to increased concentration in 
the downstream enterprises in the agri-food chain and contributed to significant 
changes in the organisation of the agri-food system.  
 
The process of industrialisation has created opportunities for smallholders in 
developing countries to produce horticultural commodities under contract according 
to certain specifics (Kandiwa, 1999), but has the danger that small farmers will be 
marginalised and excluded from high-value markets (Reardon & Barrett, 2000). The 
challenge is therefore to prevent this from happening and to find ways to link small 
growers in developing countries to these high-value markets. The question remains 
whether an arrangement such as contract farming provides the solution to this 
challenge. This article suggests that contracting, modified to suit country-specific 
conditions, can be used as a vehicle to overcome transaction cost barriers, technology, 
competition, low prices, the inelasticity of demand and the inherent instability of 
agriculture, as suggested by Bonnen & Schweikhardt (1998). The danger exists that 
the intrinsic monopsonistic nature of large agribusiness (often multinationals) could 
result in the total marginalisation of many farming communities if the introduction of 
this ‘new agriculture’ and relationships in developing areas are not well managed.  
 
3.  THE EARLIER EXPERIENCE WITH CONTRACT FARMING Contract farming, as an institution in agriculture, has a long history. Various forms of 
this institutional arrangement were employed by United States multinationals in 
Central America at the beginning of the 20th century, and by the Japanese to secure 
sugar production in Taiwan from 1885 (Runsten & Key, 1996; Rehber, 1998). In the 
period 1930–50, contracting was used increasingly in many food and fibre sectors. 
The fruit and vegetable canning sectors expanded in the United States and Europe 
(Little & Watts, 1994; Clapp, 1994) and merchants in Europe and North America 
entered into seed production contracts with growers in Australia, Britain, Canada, 
France, Holland, Hungary and the United States (Watts, 1994). From the late 1950s, 
Mexican growers increasingly supplied the American markets with fruit and 
vegetables under contract (Watts, 1994), and in the period 1960–80 there was a 
significant increase in contracting for vegetables, fruit, nuts and seed crops (Kilmer, 
1986). By the late 20th century, contract farming was widespread across Western 
Europe, the United States and Japan (Rehber, 1998). Contract farming is now a 
common organisational structure in many developed countries. 
 
Contract farming has also spread rapidly in Asia, Latin America and Africa owing to 
the higher returns earned by high-value export crops and the impact of new 
technologies (Clapp, 1994; Eicher & Staatz, 1998). Contract farming in Latin 
America has been extensively promoted since 1945 in a series of import substitution 
programmes, and has a much longer history than in Africa (Clapp, 1994; Little & 
Watts, 1994; Daddieh, 1994; Runsten & Key, 1996). In the period 1930–50, 
contracting expanded in the fruit and vegetable canning sectors of colonial Africa 
(Little & Watts, 1994) and was followed by a rapid increase in the period 1975–85, 
with some 60 schemes operating in 16 countries (Carney, 1988; Watts, 1994; Little, 
1994; Eicher & Staatz, 1998). South Africa has a long history of farming under 
contract, which includes a wide range of sharecropping arrangements dating back to 
the early 20th century (Bundy, 1979). Vertical coordination arrangements currently 
exist in the tea, fruit, sugar, flower, cotton, vegetable, timber, fishing and tobacco 
sectors (Levin, 1988; Porter & Phillips-Howard, 1997; Van Rooyen, 1999; Karaan, 
1999).  
 
Contract farming often involves a great number of variations and multiple objectives, 
which include welfare, political, social and economic criteria. Usually, this institution 
takes the form of a central processing or exporting unit purchasing harvests of 
independent farmers, but also includes multipartite, nucleus estate and informal 
models (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). The terms of the purchase are arranged through 
contracts that vary from case to case but are usually signed at planting time. Often the 
agribusiness provides credit, inputs, farm machinery and technical advice to the 
farmers in exchange for the commodity they produce (Glover, 1994; Grosh, 1994; 
Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). 
 
Contract farming can include a number of options in terms of how the contract 
between the producer and the integrator is structured, where some forms of 
contracting are dependent on specific institutions like marketing orders, bargaining 
cooperatives and marketing cooperatives (Sporleder, 1992). The contract could 
specify the price, quantity, quality, the provision of agribusiness inputs, the provision 
of credit facilities, the conditions of production, and the delivery and grading 
requirements (Sporleder, 1992; Runsten & Key, 1996). The price set in all these 
alternative arrangements could be a fixed price or a differential price (Sporleder, 1992). The various types of contract could include a marketing contract, a contract 
specifying some measure of company control, or a contract specifying the provision 
of company inputs, as well as full company control of production (Wolz & Kirsch, 
1999): 
 
•  In the case of the marketing contract, sometimes called a market specification 
contract, the producer sells the raw commodity to the processor at a specified 
price, quality and time. In this type of contract, the producer has full autonomy 
regarding production decisions (Rehber, 1998). 
•  In the second type of contract, certain company resources could be supplied and 
there is a measure of company control. In this context, the producer agrees to 
produce the raw commodity under some degree of company control and 
specification, as well as to sell the commodity to the processor at an agreed price, 
quality and time (Rehber, 1998; Wolz et al, 1999). 
•  Finally, the third type of contract includes full company control as well as the 
provision of company inputs. In this regard, complete control of the production 
process passes to the integrator, who will supervise production, provide the 
necessary inputs and services and remunerate the producer for the raw 
commodity at an agreed price (Rehber, 1998; Wolz & Kirsch, 1999). 
 
Furthermore, in certain cases of contracting, the structure of the contract is based on 
the farmer’s access to key resources like water (Morvaridi, 1995), whilst in others the 
producer does not even own the intermediate product, which remains the property of 
the integrator. In a contract like this the integrator uses the facilities and labour of the 
farmer, who is paid a fee to provide such facilities and services. This type of contract 
can ensure that the technology incorporated in the intermediate product supplied by 
the farmer is retained exclusively by the agribusiness (Martin, 1999; Goodhue, 1999). 
In addition, many contracts incorporate some credit arrangement (Wolz & Kirsch, 
1999).  
 
Given the poor performance of agriculture in many developing countries, especially in 
Africa, many donors and governments hoped that contract farming and its variants 
(outgrower schemes, nucleus estates, satellite farming) would bring about improved 
incentives, increased income for farmers and positive multiplier effects for 
impoverished rural economies. As a result, there was considerable growth in the 
number of contract farming schemes during the 1970s and 1980s. Most of these 
contract farming or outgrower schemes were multipartite arrangements involving 
private firms (often foreign), the government of the host country, non-governmental 
organisations, parastatal bodies and international aid or lending agencies, such as the 
United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank and the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (Glover, 1994; Little & Watts, 1994).  
 
Contract farming in developing countries has experienced a mixed fortune, yielding 
some successes and many failures (cf. Little & Watts, 1994; Jaffee, 1994; Glover, 
1984; Runsten & Key, 1996). Jaffee (1994), for example, talks of the ‘rocky road of 
contract farming in Kenya’. Several studies (cf. Minot, 1986; Glover, 1984, 1987, 
1994; Glover & Kusterer, 1990; Jaffee, 1994; Little & Watts, 1994; Porter & Phillips-
Howard, 1997; Runsten & Key, 1996; Eaton & Sheperd, 2001) have analysed the 
nature and performance of contract farming schemes in developing countries. These 
studies contain useful reviews of the rich case study literature on contract farming schemes in the developing world. A large number of studies on contract farming also 
came from anthropologists, political economists, sociologists and geographers (Grosh, 
1994). This literature is largely dominated by questions related to the dependency and 
world systems approach, and criticises contract farming as an institution leading to an 
increase in the marginalisation of farmers and communities that do not participate in 
contracting (Korovkin, 1992; Watts, 1994; Little, 1994). In this respect, it is argued 
that technological advances are passed on to the minority, resulting in uneven benefits 
that do not necessarily suit the needs of the developing country concerned (Meliczek, 
2000). Furthermore, there is evidence of an increase in landlessness as a result of 
contract farming expanding land requirements (Little, 1994). In the African context, 
contract farming has been observed to disrupt power relations within farm 
households; to exploit an unequal power relationship with growers; and to lead to 
growers becoming overly dependent on their contracts (Key & Runsten, 1999).  
 
The main lessons from the experience with contract farming emerging from the 
literature reveal a number of factors that determine the success of contract farming 
ventures. In general, it can be argued that the chances of success will be enhanced if 
the following measures are taken:  
 
•  The farmer partners should be properly screened. 
•  The country-specific historical and institutional legacies that have shaped local 
conditions should be taken into account in project design. 
•  Commodities requiring more labour-intensive production techniques should be 
selected. A crop that requires low levels of mechanisation and high labour inputs 
may not be suited to large producers, who could have the same labour and 
supervision problems as plantations. The production of a commodity that is 
delicate, highly perishable, involves a high level of labour inputs and a low level 
of mechanisation, and that needs a high degree of coordination, technology inputs 
and tight quality specificity is better suited to contract farming involving small 
farmers. (As discussed in Section 5, the danger still exists that agribusiness could 
prefer contract arrangements with large-scale farmers.) 
•  Crops displaying a high value per hectare, as well as requiring post-harvest 
facilities that are not feasible for the farmer, should be selected. Commodities with 
high transaction costs in marketing and processing and economies of scale higher 
in the marketing chain are the crops ideally suited for some form of vertical 
integration, such as contract farming. 
•  Mutual asset specificity between the contracting partners should be incorporated, 
thus raising the exit costs for both partners and ensuring a much more stable and 
sustainable relationship.  
•  The location and concentration of growers in relationship to the location of the 
agribusiness firm and other logistical factors should be optimised. 
•  If a competitive local market is present, contracted farmers may choose to sell to 
the fresh market instead of the contracting firm, who is often unable to legally 
enforce contractual obligations. Serious disruption to input supplies to farmers can 
result in such a situation.  
•  The legal system should be well-developed, strong and respected, ensuring 
contract enforcement at minimal costs.  
•  Contractual relations should be well managed and based on mutual trust. The 
perceived high levels of contract manipulation by agribusiness firms, distrust by 
farmers of the contractual relationship, and a perception of loss of autonomy have characterised contract farming in developing countries. Removing all elements of 
mistrust and establishing trustworthy relationships are important measures for 
success.  
•  Farmer interests should be well represented in contract negotiations. In this 
respect, the formation of farmer cooperatives in a contract farming arrangement is 
seen as the most cost-effective way to represent the interests of the contracted 
farmer, as well as for the integrator to deliver inputs and services to the individual 
farms. 
•  Agribusiness should play a key role in coordinating farmers’ access to a range of 
inputs, services and facilities. These could include promoting literacy, improving 
business skills, fostering farmer links with agribusiness and banks, establishing a 
facility for resolving conflicts, infrastructure development, etc. 
 
4.  A NEW INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONTRACT FARMING 
This section uses the principles of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) to explain 
the rationale for contract farming as an institutional arrangement, and provides an 
additional motivation for the increased vertical integration discussed in Section 2. 
Contract farming, as viewed from an NIE perspective, can be seen as one of the 
governance forms in a vertical coordination continuum that can be utilised to effect 
the requirements of higher levels of managed coordination. Contract farming is an 
intermediate form of industrial organisation in agriculture, standing between spot 
markets and full vertical integration. At the one end of the continuum, we have spot 
market transactions, with coordination of the activities in the supply chain coordinated 
by the price mechanism. This form of industrial organisation is usually applicable 
when conditions approach that of the perfect market, i.e. many buyers and sellers, 
homogeneous goods, and goods that have little quality variation and are less 
perishable. At the other end of the continuum we have fully integrated operations, 
with one company controlling all stages of the market chain (Williamson, 1979; 
Barney & Ouchi, 1988; Petersen & Wysocki, 1998). Spot markets in general show 
deficiencies in transferring production information and marketing information 
regarding quality, timing and future demand, and in overcoming problems resulting 
from imperfect input markets. Firms consequently use contracts (including contract 
farming) to overcome these problems. 
 
The NIE provides a useful theoretical framework for explaining the existence of and 
theoretical rationale for contract farming, as many of the problems of market failure 
and missing markets are typically caused by asymmetric information and a range of 
other factors that impact on transaction costs. A full set of reasons for market failure, 
in addition to the suggested optimal coordination form for each case, have been 
developed by a number of authors (cf. Minot, 1986; Grosh, 1994; Key & Runsten, 
1999). Minot’s (1986) application is illustrated in Table 1. A variant of this 
framework is provided by Key & Runsten (1999) and is summarised in Table 2. 
 
[INSERT TABLES 1 and 2] 
 
Both the first and second part of Minot’s table relate specifically to the characteristics 
of agricultural produce, namely perishability, quality, and production variability in 
terms of quantity and quality. Agricultural produce typically also varies in terms of 
moisture and sugar content, size, shape, colour, flavour, timing of delivery, and so 
forth. The issue is that consumers have particular preferences with respect to each of these characteristics and are prepared to pay premia for produce that has the desired 
qualities. Often, the problem with spot markets and the traditional price mechanism is 
that these preferences and characteristics are not well communicated through these 
markets (Key & Runsten, 1999; Grosh, 1994; Minot, 1986). When there is 
asymmetric information between the buyer and the seller regarding the quality of the 
product, product markets might break down all together – presenting a need for 
coordination through contracting. Analyses also refer to the need for information on 
production technology required for efficient production and optimum quality and the 
desired characteristics of the product. When markets for this type of information do 
not exist producers find it hard to adjust to the changing demands of consumers, 
which creates the need for forms of vertical coordination and integration. This section 
of Minot’s table thus confirms in many ways why contract farming could exist in the 
context of the new developments in food and agricultural markets discussed in 
Section 2.  
 
Another central part of the theory of contract farming refers specifically to the failures 
of the major factor markets, land, credit, inputs and services (reflected in the last 
section of Table 1). These market failures, especially the unavailability of production 
credit, limit the adoption of new crops and also restrict the access to inputs, 
technology and information that is necessary to produce a timely and good quality 
product. Many farmers are therefore unable to produce a particular commodity, had it 
not been for the supply of credit and inputs by the agribusiness firm or estate.  
 
Many of the commodities traditionally grown under contract farming in developing 
countries have long gestation periods requiring substantial capital investment. In the 
light of the failure of capital markets in developing economies, contract farming acts 
as an institution overcoming capital market failures – it is thus a form of interlocking 
factor market contract. The contracting firm supplies production material and inputs 
on credit and uses the future delivery of the crop as collateral. In this way many 
farmers have obtained the opportunity to produce something they would not have 
done otherwise. This relationship between producers and the firm can, however, be 
endangered if there are other opportunities for producers to sell their product. Owing 
to weak legal institutions not guaranteeing contract enforcement in many countries, 
chances of opportunistic behaviour of growers do exist, providing an important risk 
element to the contracting firm. However, Key & Runsten (1999) stress the point that 
agribusiness firms are often in a much better position to provide production loans to 
growers owing to the limited alternative markets and low monitoring, enforcement 
and other transaction costs.  
 
One option to eliminate most of the problems discussed earlier is for agribusiness 
firms to opt for vertical integration whereby all stages of the marketing chain – from 
production to consumption – take place within one firm. However, due to typical 
problems in the labour market (shirking, supervision costs, etc.), vertical integration is 
seen as inferior to the contracting option. In commodities where labour input is fairly 
high, the plantation or vertical integrated models will clearly provide diseconomies of 
scale and inefficient outcomes, thus opening the way for small-scale family farms.  
 
This is confirmed by the analysis of Delgado (1999), who applied a similar review of 
the specific factors in rural Africa most likely to be associated with transaction costs, 
and the way in which they shape the type of producer organisation most suited to dealing with them. His analysis provides an added dimension of the commodity 
characteristics to the theoretical explanation for the existence of contract farming and 
other forms of vertical integration. These include some of the aspects discussed in 
greater detail in Section 2. To a large extent, however, Delgado (1999) also confirms 
the points made by the other authors referenced in this section.  
 
It is important to recognise that individual commodities have both production and 
marketing characteristics that will determine the most optimal form of production 
organisation for that specific commodity (Hobbs & Young, 1999). As shown earlier, 
high labour intensity favours smallholder organisation, whereas both economies of 
scale and heavy investment requirements in production produce the opposite effect. 
Delgado (1999) argues that most commodity-specific transaction costs arise in 
marketing and processing. Contract farming reduces the need for labour supervision 
while increasing the access of producers to needed inputs and skills. High 
perishability also tends to discourage independent small-scale operators, because of 
the high risks involved in not having an assured processor market.  
 
A high value-to-weight ratio tends to be associated with greater risks in marketing and 
a more specialised clientele, leading to contractual or vertically integrated forms of 
organisation. Similarly, the absence of domestic markets for export items makes it 
risky to produce outside a marketing structure that can handle these items. Finally, 
items such as cut flowers and vegetables that are exported to Europe tend to be 
characterised by economies of scale in marketing, as are other perishables that require 
a cold chain for handling. Such economies of scale tend to lock out independent small 
operators (Delgado, 1999).  
 
5.  ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CONTRACTING IN 
AGRICULTURE 
5.1  Advantages to the producer 
The enthusiasm of donors about the benefits of contracting in developing countries 
has resulted in inflated expectations of the potential of this institution (Little, 1994). 
Nevertheless, there are benefits to the farmer, as discussed below. 
 
Contracting allows farmers to overcome the barriers of entry into crop- and animal-
specific sectors, as explained earlier in Section 2. Farmers usually enter into contract 
production in order to reduce cost and gain access to information, technology, 
marketing channels, managerial skills, technical expertise, access to plant and 
equipment and patented production procedures (Carney, 1988; Rhodes, 1993; Glover, 
1994; Clapp, 1994; Jackson & Cheater, 1994; Little, 1994; Royer, 1995; Pasour, 
1998; Delgado, 1999; Vellema, 2000). Contracting could also improve access to 
capital and credit (Hudson, 2000). This is a major concern for most farmers and 
especially so in developing countries. Farmers are prepared to relinquish their 
autonomy for the sake of being able to produce.  
 
Contracting farmers can reduce production costs and increase production and income 
as a result of their use of new technology and their access to company inputs (Watts, 
1994; Clapp, 1994). The reduction in cost is due to better technology, better collective 
decisions and reduced transport and marketing costs (Hennessy, 1996; Pasour, 1998), 
cheap inputs from the integrator and, as a result of this, the ability to increase economies of scale (Royer, 1995), or technology developed by the integrator that can 
reduce cost (Pasour, 1998).  
 
Contracting farmers can reduce marketing risk and stabilise income and, in this sense, 
the integrator provides a form of insurance (Featherstone & Sherrick, 1992; Watts, 
1994; Jackson & Cheater, 1994; Runsten & Key, 1996; Wolz & Kirsch, 1999; 
Flaskerud & Klenow, 1999; Martin, 1999; Colchao, 1999; Sofranko et al., 2000). At 
the same time, contracts may simplify production and marketing decisions, thus 
improving the farmer’s effectiveness (Hudson, 2000). The reduction of marketing risk 
through the demand assurance embodied in a contract is also appealing to farmers, 
especially those producing products for which the markets are thin. 
 
Contracting farmers can increase profit opportunities through a greater product range 
and differentiated products (Pasour, 1998), or by diversifying out of traditional crops 
in developing countries in order to grow high-value crops and thereby increase their 
income (Williams, 1985; Levin, 1988; Korovkin, 1992; Glover, 1994; Von Braun & 
Immink, 1994; Kennedy, 1994; Delgado, 1999; Coulter et al., 1999). There is 
widespread evidence of an improvement in farmer income in developing countries as 
a result of contracting (Levin, 1988; Clapp, 1994), although the effect of an increase 
in production costs is sometimes not considered when evaluating the incidence of 
increased income (Little, 1994). In addition, the distribution impacts of this increased 
income is not assessed. 
 
In conclusion, the educational experience of interacting with an agribusiness partner 
can provide a platform for farmers in developing countries who are attempting to 
convert from subsistence to commercial farming (Glover, 1984, 1994; Sofranko et al., 
2000).  
 
5.2  Disadvantages to producers  
Most of the critique against contract farming schemes makes reference to the 
disadvantages to the farmers embedded in the contractual arrangements. These 
disadvantages include farmers’ loss of autonomy, increased production risk, increased 
market power of agribusiness and increased concentration leading to reduced 
producer income. 
 
There is a universal loss of autonomy as farmers operate under a centralised control 
system (Schrader, 1986; Currie & Ray, 1986; Levin, 1988; Korovkin, 1992; 
Morvaridi, 1995; Pasour, 1998; Rehber, 1998; Wolz & Kirsch, 1999; Colchao, 1999; 
Sofranko et al., 2000) and the contracted farmer is sometimes reduced to little more 
than a hired hand (Clapp, 1994). Conversely, it can be argued that the independent 
farmer who is heavily indebted has much the same status (Watts, 1994). It is also said 
that producers are disadvantaged by the high level of manipulation of the contract, in 
terms of both the legal and tacit arrangements (Glover, 1984, 1987; Porter & Phillips-
Howard, 1997), and by the fact that contracting undermines traditional structures and 
support systems (Korovkin, 1992). Moreover, contracting is often associated with 
higher levels of family conflict (Watts, 1994). 
 
A further source of criticism is related to increased production risk due to the need to 
meet the contractual obligations of the integrator (Royer, 1995). In this sense, risk can 
also increase in that the farmer invests in highly specific fixed production assets, combined with the non-assurance of a permanent contract or the chance that the 
integrator may default (Featherstone & Sherrick, 1992; Royer, 1995; Rehber, 1998). 
Production risk is increased especially when farmers in developing countries diversify 
out of traditional crops into non-traditional crops where the technology has not been 
developed locally (Runsten & Key, 1996).  
 
Contracting universally increases land-use intensity and can lead to higher levels of 
pollution (Runsten & Key, 1996). Contract farming in developing countries can result 
in decreased food production and increased food security problems as a result of the 
concentration on contract crops (Glover, 1994; Clapp, 1994; Morvaridi, 1995; Rehber, 
1998).  
 
It is accepted that prices paid to the contractor will be less than spot market prices 
because of the reduction in marketing risk to the farmer and the increased market 
power of the contracting firm. The result of this is reduced income (Pasour, 1998). 
This situation might especially penalise a contracted farmer with high levels of 
capitalisation and managerial skills where an open market exists for the same crop 
(Runsten & Key, 1996; Rehber, 1998). Moreover, contract production often involves 
a high-cost package of inputs that require financing facilities. The change in cost 
structure is especially marked in developing countries when farmers diversify out of 
traditional crops, and can negate the effect of increased revenue (Von Braun & 
Immink, 1994; Little, 1994). Farmers incur additional cost because of the need to 
coordinate their production to suit the integrator, as well as to liaise for the use of 
company inputs and services (Glover, 1987).  
 
5.3  Benefits to agribusiness firms 
The benefits to the agribusiness firm from a contract-farming venture revolve mainly 
around cost reduction, quality control and reduced uncertainty with regard to the 
supply of raw material. Cost is reduced as a result of a more synchronised input-
output processing function (Kilmer, 1986; Azzam, 1996) and the cost and financing of 
production are passed on to the farmer (Schrader, 1986) without the loss of control 
(Rhodes, 1993). The company can ensure that the quality of large volumes of the raw 
commodity is better controlled (King, 1992; Featherstone & Sherrick, 1992; 
Goodhue, 1999) and that the company’s technology is properly adopted by the 
producer (Leathers, 1999). Further advantages to the company are the ability to 
reduce the cost of the raw commodity supplied by the contracted farmer through 
assuming the marketing risk of the farmer and thus reducing related farmer marketing 
and transport costs (Glover, 1984; Kumar, 1995). Owing to a relatively stronger 
bargaining position in the contractual arrangement, the agribusiness is also able to 
influence favourable farmer commodity prices (Delgado, 1999). Contracting thus 
removes the production risk to the farmer and eliminates the uncertainty of large 
volumes of input (raw material) supply (Levin, 1988; Korovkin, 1992). Because the 
quality of inputs is more consistent, the risk of dissatisfied consumers is reduced 
(Pasour, 1998; Rehber, 1998; Wolz & Kirsch, 1999).  
 
Advantages that are specific to agribusiness firms in developing countries are the 
substantial political economy gains as a result of involvement in national development 
projects, or because the government is a party to the contracting arrangement 
(Hayami, 1990; Binswanger et al., 1993; Watts, 1994; Little, 1994), where this can 
translate into more tangible economic benefits resulting from government intervention or cheap credit (Clapp, 1994; Morvaridi, 1995). In conclusion, agribusiness firms in 
developing countries that are not allowed to own land can use contract farming with 
local farmers to overcome this constraint. This happened in many parts of Latin 
America where multinational agribusiness firms used contract farming to secure a 
constant flow of commodities for their processing and export ventures (Runsten & 
Key, 1996).  
 
5.4  Disadvantages for agribusiness firms  
A principal disadvantage frequently associated with contract farming in developing 
countries is the high level of transaction costs. Transaction costs are often excessive in 
projects involving large numbers of small farmers who are spatially dispersed, require 
high levels of inputs and support and who make smaller, more frequent deliveries to 
the agribusiness (Key & Runsten, 1999).  
 
Excessive transaction costs are generated as a result of the structuring, administering 
and enforcing of the large number of contracts (Barry et al., 1992). Moreover, the 
integrator incurs additional supervision and monitoring costs in conjunction with the 
non-cost-effective delivery of services and inputs to farms that are small and spatially 
dispersed. In this regard, it is estimated that dealing with larger farmers, who make 
less use of inputs and deliver in greater volumes, results in lower levels of transaction 
cost. Coulter et al. (1999) refers to an example of horticultural exporters in Zimbabwe 
who pay their smallholder suppliers 30 per cent of the price per kilogram paid to the 
large-scale farmers in order to break even. Contracting firms could easily (and usually 
do) prefer to deal with larger growers, which makes the relationship much more 
profitable but contributes to many smallholders being shut out from production.  
 
Evidence is already emerging that agribusiness firms prefer to deal with larger 
farmers in order to reduce transaction costs and achieve greater consistency of quality 
and supply. In the United States, for example, contract farms are significantly bigger 
than non-contract farms (Sofranko et al., 2000) and, if the raw commodity offers 
economies of scale and is not labour intensive, large farmers have a production 
advantage (Glover, 1984; Runsten & Key, 1996). Further, larger producers who are 
located closer to highways have often been quicker to respond to contracting 
opportunities (Von Braun & Immink, 1994). Processors often prefer to deal with this 
type of producer because they are more geographically concentrated than small 
farmers and because of the reduced cost of procurement (Pasour, 1998). Large 
farmers, with higher levels of capitalisation and management skills, reduce the risk 
related to supply (Coulter et al., 1999) and have a better chance of success (Little & 
Watts, 1994). Larger farmers tend to be better educated and better able to adopt 
technology, are able to acquire specialised capital inputs more easily, require less 
inputs from the integrator and less monitoring, and the larger volumes supplied reduce 
the cost of interaction. Furthermore, agribusiness dealings with small farmers in 
developing countries have often resulted in increased cost per capita in respect of 
administration, services rendered, transportation and communication. Moreover, small 
farmers borrow more, more frequently require the use of specialised equipment, 
require more intensive monitoring and make more frequent deliveries of smaller 
quantities to the integrator, resulting in increased cost per unit of raw commodity 
supplied. In a situation where contracting is not legally enforceable, the costs of 
screening potential contract farmers is a function of the number of farmers screened 
and, in this respect, larger farms cost proportionally less (Runsten & Key, 1996).  
This reality presents a great danger for small-scale farmers in developing countries, 
and may lead to their exclusion from contract opportunities. How this can be 
prevented is discussed in the next section. 
 
6.  CONTRACT FARMING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: QUO VADIS? 
The forces of globalisation and industrialisation in world agriculture have prompted 
new ways of organising the agri-food sector. At the end of the 1980s, the agricultural 
and food sector was characterised by firms operating highly autonomously. 
Nowadays, because of the need for a year-round supply, product assortment and 
developments in information technology, the agricultural sector is changing into a 
sector of international networks of firms (Overboom, 2000). Vertical coordination of 
food supply chains has gained a great deal of attention. Of particular concern is the 
effect of all these devel opments on the future of small-scale agriculture in developing 
countries. Reardon & Barrett (2000) show how these changes have caused small firms 
and farms to go out of business under the new competitive pressures. The new 
competitive environment leads to industrial concentration, with practices that result in 
the exclusion of domestic firms and small farmers from the benefits and rewards of 
the high-value markets.  
 
The key issue is therefore to establish the types of institutions that can help ensure 
that the poor benefit from globalisation and industrialisation. For example, what is the 
role of cooperatives, contracting arrangements, market regulation and food and safety 
standards in facilitating smallholder farmers’ access to expanding markets for higher-
value products?  
 
Contract farming has been implemented widely in developing countries as a means to 
reduce risk and ensure throughput volumes of known quality and price. In a similar 
fashion, in most countries there has been a rapid increase in the use of different forms 
of contract (market and production contracts) in agriculture as a way to ensure quality, 
coordination and desired product attributes. Many people see contracts as a means to 
reduce coordination costs within the food supply chain. Most of these contracts are 
with large national and multinational food corporations. As the dominance and market 
power of these firms often create an unfair playing field, people may question the 
appropriateness of contracts in ensuring that small farmers in developing countries are 
part of the ‘new agriculture’.  
 
The danger with most contract farming types is that it displaces decision-making 
authority from the farmer to the downstream processor or distributor, thus turning the 
farmers into quasi-employees. This happens when the contractor supplies all inputs as 
well as production guidelines and instructions, and then subtracts all these costs from 
the producer payment at the time of delivery.  
 
Other problems relate to the high per unit costs of contracting with small-scale 
farmers, as discussed in Section 5.4. In addition, because these farmers are perceived 
to have greater problems in meeting stringent quality and safety requirements, 
agribusiness firms favour contracts with medium- to large-scale farmers (Key & 
Runsten, 1999). Add to this the problem of enforcing contracts in most developing 
countries due to poorly developed judicial systems. These factors could contribute to 
smallholders not being preferred as parties to contracting arrangements.   
A review of the literature on agricultural contracts in general and contract farming in 
developing countries in particular, provides a good platform for assessing the future 
of contract farming in developing countries as one form of vertical organisation and 
coordination in agricultural supply chains. If we accept the premise that contract 
farming remains an important vehicle to keep small farmers involved in markets for 
high-value crops and animal products, it is now important to take the lessons from the 
experience with contract farming and use them to improve the workings of this 
institution. With the evolution and increasing prevalence of vertical coordination in 
agriculture, the theoretical framework for evaluating these developments has also 
evolved. Several aspects of the New Institutional Economics, such as contract theory, 
agency relationships (principle agent problems, incomplete contracts), transaction 
costs and the boundaries of the firm, have become key focus areas (Barry et al., 
1992). This theoretical framework is useful in analysing the relationships between the 
farmer (agent) and the agribusiness (the principal), where decisions about the extent 
of vertical coordination and related contract specifications can influence the financial 
position and performance of both parties. In the context of contract farming, this 
framework can be used to analyse and address the problems that could typically 
constrain or lead to the breakdown of contractual relations in developing country 
agriculture.  
 
The problems and disadvantages of contract farming that could contribute to the 
exclusion of smallholders from contractual relationships, as discussed earlier, can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
•  Enforcement of contracts 
•  High transaction costs of dealing with many smallholders 
•  Strict demands for consistency (no variation), quality, food safety, due diligence, 
etc. 
•  Business attitudes and ethics referring to non-payment, delayed payments or even 
reduced payments 
•  High rate of product rejection by agribusiness firms and traders (Kherallah, 2000) 
•  Weak bargaining position of farmers vis-à-vis a limited number of traders 
(Kherallah, 2000) 
 
Despite the vital role contract farming can play in providing services and market 
access to smallholders, these problems result in high costs and often undermine the 
viability and sustainability of contract farming in developing countries. The two main 
problems relate to contract default and enforcement and the scale of farming 
operations leading to high per unit transaction costs. Solutions to these various 
constraints could go a long way in improving the viability of contract farming. 
Possible solutions are discussed in some detail below. 
 
6.1  Contract enforcement  
Although contract farming involves a written agreement between farmers and the 
agribusiness firm or integrator, these contracts are seldom legally enforceable in 
practice (Grosh, 1994). The poorly developed legal institutions in developing 
countries contribute to high transaction costs in suing individual smallholders for 
contract breach. Enforcing a contract also leads to souring the relationship between 
the farmers and the firm, as well as between the agribusiness and the community. Adding to these high costs in terms of financial and community relations is the fact 
that in many countries the contracts are often viewed as legally unenforceable. Thus, 
the only real threat at the disposal of the contracting firm is to discontinue the contract 
with those farmers not complying with its terms and then to write off lost income. 
Because of these costs, firms deal only with growers who are less likely to default 
(often larger growers) and to screen applicants. These screening and enforcement 
costs are fixed costs and can be minimised by reducing the number of contract 
farmers, thus favouring larger growers (Key & Runsten, 1999). 
 
Farmers sometimes break contract either on account of production failure or because 
they have sold the produce to competing buyers or to the local spot market. When 
there is a good market at harvest, many farmers are lured by higher spot prices where 
they can sell their produce for cash. In this way they avoid the repayment of credit, 
which is usually subtracted at the time of delivery. The farmer often claims 
production failure for the lack of compliance with the contract. The absence of 
effective legal systems and lack of collateral held by smallholders, as well as the weak 
insurance markets, create considerable risk for companies engaging in contract 
farming with smallholders (Coulter et al., 1999). Because of the risk of default, many 
agribusinesses or traders have discontinued the process of supplying inputs to farmers 
(Kherallah, 2000), again creating barriers preventing entry to agricultural markets by 
some smallholders. 
 
How does one resolve the problem of farmer default? Agribusiness has developed a 
number of innovative mechanisms to deal with this problem, mainly in the case of 
high-value crops. These mechanisms, which are discussed in more detail in Coulter et 
al. (1999), are the following: 
 
•  Lending through groups: Providing inputs and services through groups of 
smallholders reduces per unit transaction costs and risk of default. 
•  Good communication and close monitoring: This helps foster good company-
farmer relations and a sense of trust, which can contribute to minimising strategic 
default. 
•  Range and quality of services offered: The better and broader the range of 
services offered, the closer the relationship between the farmer and business and 
the more the farmer stands to lose by breaking the relationship. Delivering timely 
services according to farmers’ needs will foster trust and reduce the risk of 
default. 
•  Incentives: There should be incentives for repayment and strict management of 
defaulters. 
•  Cooperation between buyers: Agreements between agribusiness firms not to 
purchase from farmers under contract from other buyers, or through a joint 
operation of contract farming schemes, can also reduce the risk of default.  
 
In the absence of public mechanisms for contract enforcement, private enforcement 
mechanisms can be of help. A study by Gow et al. (2000) has shown that the use of 
internal private mechanisms for contract enforcement through contractual 
arrangements between two parties in an exchange can make contracts ‘self-enforcing’. 
The introduction of contract innovations and associated support programmes in this 
case study induced output and productivity growth in both the agribusiness and the 
farmers. An input provision and investment facilitation programme was introduced for farms that signed long-term contracts with the company. The investment 
facilitation programme consisted of a guarantee at the state agricultural bank plus an 
interest rate subsidy. This investment ensured that the agribusiness was less likely to 
breach its part of the contract due to the increase of its costs of contract breach. At the 
same time, it reduced the costs for contract hold-up for these producers and 
contributed to increased investment in the particular commodity by the farmers. This 
programme therefore increased the private enforcement capital to the contract and 
improved incentives for the contracted farms to make contract-specific investments. 
 
In other parts of the developing world, one finds that legal institutions do not play an 
important role in the enforcement of contracts. An analysis by Fafchamps & Minten 
(1999) suggests that trust-based relationships are the dominant contract enforcement 
mechanism under these circumstances. Trust is established primarily through the 
repeated transactions of the contracted parties. Trust and soci al networks are usually 
the mechanisms by which transactions and contractual arrangements in developing 
countries are enforced and thus provide another alternative to be considered in 
reducing contract default. With many agribusiness firms controlled by multinational 
interests and often from a different ethnic group usually related to previous colonial 
regimes, one would expect that trustworthy relationships would be hard to come by. 
Striving towards establishing trustworthy relationships would, however, still be 
important. 
 
6.2  High transaction costs 
When agribusiness firms contract with a number of smallholders they incur high 
transaction costs, as shown in the discussion earlier. A greater number of producers 
means more trips to them by extension agents, more monitoring of pesticide 
violations, more deliveries of inputs and also more deliveries by smallholders. 
Smallholders are often dispersed and difficult to reach, which adds to the costs of 
service delivery and monitoring. Smallholders also require more inputs and capital 
from the firm per unit of production, as well as specialised machinery and much more 
extension assistance (Key & Runsten, 1999). Despite the inherent efficiency of small-
scale farmers and the fact that it is sometimes politically attractive to deal with them, 
the high costs of supervision and other related per unit transaction costs are often 
prohibitive. Contracting firms therefore usually prefer to deal with larger growers, 
which makes the relationship much more profitable but tends to shut many 
smallholders out from production opportunities and markets.  
 
Key & Runsten (1999) cite a case study in Mexico where a local frozen vegetable 
firm managed to engage in successful contracting with smallholders despite the 
inherent problems listed above. The company designed contracts that both parties 
found profitable. The firm offered resource-providing contracts that delivered credit, 
specialised inputs and extension advice. The credit to the farmers was advanced 
against no collateral in the form of seedlings, all pesticides and fertilisers. The value 
of these advances was equal to about 40 per cent of total production costs, with the 
farmers being responsible for land, labour and the costs of land preparation. The out-
of-pocket costs for the farmers were thus in the same range as the costs for maize. In 
addition, the company introduced a management strategy that further reduced 
transaction costs. Participation by smallholders was restricted to a certain location and 
chemical control decisions were taken by an agronomist who visited growers once a 
week, carrying all material with him at all times. Farmers were responsible for obtaining their seedlings and fertilisers from the firm’s ranches and for delivering 
their harvests. This strategy has reduced transaction costs tremendously, making the 
contract arrangement with the smallholders profitable. 
 
One approach suggested by Coulter et al. (1999) to counter the problem of high 
transaction costs of dealing with smallholders is to consider the promotion of farmer 
groups or farmer-controlled enterprises (commonly also referred to as cooperatives) in 
conjunction with a contract-farming venture. The cooperative could bargain and 
negotiate prices and the terms of the contract on behalf of the farmers. It can also be 
instrumental in providing information, inputs, technical and quality assistance to the 
growers. The agribusiness as such will have a stake in strengthening such institutions 
since it will contribute to considerably lower transaction costs. These cooperatives 
should be assisted by the agribusiness through training in literacy and numeracy and 
also improving their ability to bargain effectively (despite this not being in the direct 
interest of the agribusiness). This would help the farmers’ group or cooperative not to 
become excessively linkage dependent. Owing to the poor record of agricultural 
cooperatives in developing countries, it is important that such cooperatives be 
established on sound principles that will ensure their sustainability. The recent work 
by Cook & Chaddad (2000) provides an indication of the aspects that should be taken 
into account to ensure that cooperatives (or ‘new generation cooperatives’, as these 
authors call them) provide the necessary benefits to producers in any contractual or 
marketing arrangement.  
 
Both Kherallah (2000) and Coulter et al. (1999) use the activities of the Fresh Produce 
Exporters’ Association of Kenya (FPEAK) as an example to illustrate the value of 
grass-roots activity in promoting linkages of smallholders with agribusiness 
(exporters). FPEAK supports small farmer groups through technical assistance and 
training, small grants to invest in infrastructure such as grading sheds and charcoal 
coolers, and loans to purchase inputs. It also provides services such as market 
intelligence and market promotion. The technical and financial support has made it 
possible for many farmers to meet the strict requirements and standards of the United 
Kingdom supermarkets – the largest buyers of Kenyan fresh produce. By assigning 
groups of farmers to different exporters it was now more profitable for exporters to 
contract with small-scale farmers (Kherallah, 2000). This organisation has thus 
addressed not only the issue of high transaction costs in dealing with smallholders, but 
also the problem of product quality and standards, which is a major concern for most 
traders.  
 
Although the quick growth of contract farming in the last couple of years can be 
ascribed to the importance of grades and standards in the fresh food industry, as 
established by multinational firms and consortia (Reardon & Barrett, 2000), the above 
discussion illustrates the difficulty in enforcing such measures when dealing with a 
large number of smallholders. Additional support from farmer or grass-roots 
organisations or the government will be needed to ensure that this does not lead to the 
exclusion of smallholders from contracting opportunities due to their non-compliance 
with food safety and quality standards. 
 
Dorward et al. (1998) list the conditions for successful interlocking contracts between 
smallholders and agribusiness, and in a certain sense they address all the problems related to contract farming raised at the beginning of this section. The conditions are 
the following: 
 
•  Increased competition among traders or firms to prevent monopsonistic control 
(this, however, creates opportunities for side-selling, leading to problems of 
contract enforcement) 
•  A guaranteed outlet for the final product 
•  An effective repayment mechanism through loan groups of farmers  
•  Access to market information by farmers to prevent exploitation and to 
strengthen bargaining power 
•  Volume of transactions that are large enough to reduce transaction costs (this can 
be achieved through farmer cooperatives or farmer groups) 
•  A well-established formal or informal network of traders to control rogue traders 
•  Little alternative sources of raw material to prevent the trader or agribusiness 
from buying from other farmers 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
In view of the changing nature of world agriculture and food markets and the resulting 
need for vertical coordination along the agri-food supply chains, this article considers 
the role of contract farming as an institution to ensure the continued participation of 
small-scale producers in developing countries in the markets for high-value and 
animal products. The article first discusses the theoretical rationale for contract 
farming and illustrates how the New Institutional Economics can be used to show 
how contract farming as institutional arrangement overcomes input market failures 
and asymmetric information problems in the output market. Contract farming has 
been a feature of the agricultural sector in many developing countries since the 1960s 
and a large body of literature has documented the experience with contract farming. 
This article briefly reviews this literature and highlights the main problems normally 
associated with contract farming ventures, which lead to many failures and mistrust 
between agribusiness and smallholder families. These problems are: 
 
•  Poor enforcement of contracts 
•  High transaction costs in dealing with many smallholders 
•  Strict demands for consistency (no variation), quality, food safety, due diligence, 
etc. 
•  Business attitudes and ethics referring to non-payment, delayed payments or even 
reduced payments 
•  High rate of product rejection by agribusiness firms and traders  
•  Weak bargaining position of farmers vis-à-vis a limited number of traders 
 
The two main problems relate to contract default and enforcement and the scale of 
farming operations leading to high per unit transaction costs, and are discussed at 
some length. Some solutions to these problems are provided and could go a long way 
in improving the viability of contract farming. However, it is suggested that much 
more research within the context of the New Institutional Economics framework is 
needed to study contractual relations in developing country agriculture, and to find 
appropriate solutions to prevent future failures of contracting ventures and further 
exclusion of smallholders from high-value markets. In this context, we are of the 
opinion that research into contract enforcement mechanisms, principle-agent problems, governance of supply chains and farmer cooperatives could provide 
valuable information to secure an important role for contract farming to link 
smallholders and the agribusiness firms in the high-value markets.  
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